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Okello’s insight on sports safety and security operations at Mandela National Stadium during international competitions

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Dixon Adol Okello is a FIFA & CAF Safety and Security Officer. He is a CAF Security trainer, UK Level 7 Crowd management Expert and also a UK Level 7 Events management guru.

The vastly experienced Okello shares his views about the sports safety and security operations at Mandela National Stadium during international competitions.

Overview:

Mandela National stadium was approved to host AFCON and World Cup qualifier international matches after its 3-4 years of general stadium renovation.

The National football team (The Cranes) hosts all its international matches from this stadium ever since CAF approved its use in June 2024.

 During these competitions, the FUFA safety and security committee / functional area has had a responsibility of ensuring that such matches are safe and secure from any threat that may injure or damage any key assets of the competition.

The functional area conducts its business under the leadership of the International Match Organizing Committee (IMOC) which is the overall committee responsible for the organization of such international matches.

This overview focuses on highlighting the manner in which safety and security has been conducted at Mandela National Stadium during these international matches since June 2024 and further suggest recommendations to avert any identified gaps.

Provided Safety and security arrangements during international matches.

During international football matches at Namboole stadium, the following safety and security arrangements have occasionally been implemented;-

Prior to match day

• About 1-3 general security meetings have been conducted during each of these games
• Visiting teams are provided with police security as they move within the country.

On match day

• About 50-100 stewards are deployed
• Stewards are provided with yellow bibs (similar to those of stadium staff) and a meal is provided to them within the day.
• A considerable number of body builders (bouncers) are brought onboard to support security operations.
• A huge number of police and military personnel are deployed at entry/exit points, inside and outside the stadium.
• Police security is provided for cars parked in the stadium parking lot
• Some FUFA senior officials are deployed to supervise entry gate operations
• Barriers are raised around approaches to the VIP sections and the competition area
• Turnstiles are operationalized with a 5 tier security deployment
• Stewards are deployed in the stands, competition area, field of play and at the entry gates. Amongst others

Post-match

• Payment of all recruited personnel who worked and supported safety and security operations.

Observed Safety and security gaps while organizing international matches

Despite the above mentioned measures implemented on match day, a number of gaps have been observed as:-

Prior to match day

• Absence of an integrated planning approach for the functional areas. Each functional area plans independently with a different operational picture hence affecting the overall security operations.
• Absence of security specific preparatory meetings. Most pre match meetings are IMOC meetings were security aspects are only highlighted, however, security specific meetings aimed at planning, integration and testing are rarely conducted.
• Due to limited funds and little consideration of safety and security plans, the preliminary stages of safety and security delivery are always not considered and implemented. These include; – risk assessment, development of plans, plan integration, operational readiness tests and rehearsals.
• Security arrangements of the visiting team were often organized by a different functional area other than safety and security. This creates a high security risk for not only the visiting team but also the host country as such a functional area lacks the necessary expertise in providing the required safety and security for the visiting team.

On match day

Considering that the first steps into the safety and security delivery process weren’t conducted, match day safety and security implementation becomes challenging as only speculations and common practices dictate implementation measures. Amongst the observed flows include;-

• Functional area operational conflicts; since each functional area planned separately, implementation gets characterized with conflicting arrangements. Eg. Deployment of bouncers in places meant for stewards, mounting barriers in places that are less vulnerable and leaving out most vulnerable areas like approaches to entry points, search and screening, locking small gates in the VVIP section by hospitality team etc.
• Absence of zone ex operations; this is a modern security practice meant to deter unauthorized and unwanted fans from approaching the delicate entry points. No zone ex operations have ever been implemented at Nambole, thereby exposing vulnerable entry points to non-ticketed fans who usually spark off a number of unwanted situations at these points.
• Poor ticket distributions for both access gates and section seats; since the ticketing functional area plans without security FA involvement, it has occasionally poorly distributed tickets amongst the stadium entry points thereby facilitating crowd build ups especially at the southern gate.
• Poor ingress and egress arrangements; In the absence of an ingress and egress plan, there has always been inadequate search and screening lanes at entry points, and in some peak times, search and screening gets abandoned, thereby exposing the stadium to entry of both prohibited and restricted items. Cars use same access routes with pedestrians, while security personnel have an unrestricted entry and entry of their non-ticketed companions, etc.
• Turnstile malfunction and absence of an alternative plan; this malfunction has happened continuously at every Ug. Cranes game thereby creating an unwanted crowd build up at the turnstile which later results into forced entry of both ticketed and non-ticket fans.
• Inadequate stewards; based on the stadium design, not less than 200 stewards are needed at any single international Ug. Cranes game. However, the security committee has often been instructed to operate within less than 100 stewards hence understaffing stewards at sensitive places like at vomitories and also abandoning other critical areas like at the section barrier points.
• Crowd build-ups at access points; the absence of a zone ex operation that would limit the number of people approaching entry points, a poor search and screening regime and the turnstile malfunction, makes crowd build up at entry points inevitable but also very risky to serious injuries and fatalities.
• Sell of fake tickets; the improper use of supporting security agencies contributed to the increased sell of fake tickets. Fake tickets was the most contributing factor to turnstile malfunction during the Uganda Vs Congo game that later resulted to forced opening of exit gates for entry of the surged crowd so as to avoid a crowd crush.
• Improper use of supporting security agencies and bouncers; besides questioning the deployment of army security at these events, police is meant to protect and maintain the integrity of zone ex, fish out fake ticket agents, provide a standby supportive role to stewards at the entry gates, bowl etc. However, their uninformed deployment within the stadium, moving around with buttons and a times guns as has been in the recent games, pollutes the safety and enjoyable atmosphere of spectators at the stadium.

Observed consequences

• Loss of revenue
• Considering money lost through purchase of fake tickets, entry of fans under the cover of security personnel and some FUFA staff, massive forced entry of hundreds of non-ticketed fans after a crowd buildup at entry points, unexploited revenue avenues like spectator parking spaces etc. makes FUFA to lose out considerable amounts of money at each international match.
• Damage to facilities
• Due to absence of an ingress and egress plan, the crowd pressure at certain gates have led to damaging access gates as they force their way into the stadium.
• Reputation damage
• The purchase of fake tickets, heavy traffic jam that makes some spectators reach the stadium past kick off time, the entry crowd build up that makes spectators miss a big portion of the match, overcrowding in the spectator accommodation due to ticketing lapses, and criminal activities on spectators as they exit zone ex routes, dents the reputation of the event organizer as is considered incompetent in delivering a safe, secure and enjoyable event.
• Compromised safety and security operations that fail to optimally operate after crowd incidents at access points. The inability of the safety and security functional area to conduct all the necessary steps of the delivery process makes implementation vulnerable to both envisaged and obvious threats. This explains why ingress and egress operations get severely compromised as well as spectator accommodation within the stadium bowl every time there is an international match.

Likely future consequences

• Loss of lives
  • Considering the high crowd densities at entry points during peak hours and the subsequent forced entry through the access gates during each of the Uganda Cranes game since renovation, mere misses to loss of lives have been registered at each of these incidents. The likelihood of these mere misses turning into fatalities is eminent in the coming games unless there is a considerable change in the safety and security approach.
• Serious injuries
  • During each of these forced entries, a number of injuries have been observed as people fall while running to the stadium from the gates. Some are stepped on though register minor injuries. It is very likely that in the subsequent forced entries, some people might register serious injuries that require hospitalization.
• Payment of fines
  • Violation of CAF / FIFA safety and security regulations call for payment of heavy fines. A number of security personnel have been seen carrying guns within the stadium premises, an act that is contrary to the above regulations and calls for heavy fines. The limited number of stewards planned to work on match days put the field of play at risk of pitch invasion which is a punishable incident with heavy fines under the CAF regulations.

Recommendations

• FUFA and IMOC need to prioritize the relevance of safety and security over any other match operations. This prioritization is considered best practice within FIFA and CAF match organizing culture. Such prioritization covers;
• Event Planning and budgeting
• Command and control
• Receiving and acting on recommendations/request of the safety and security functional area with utmost importance.
• Provide safety and security committee with the required operational space to conduct its full operations without interferences from the gold / silver commanders. Often times, IMOC and some executive directives have operated within the operational spaces of the security FA. Eg. Contacting and engaging security agencies for the security supportive role which has often been done by IMOC, hiring and raising barriers at the venue, determining number of stewards to deploy, determining security deployment plans etc. such interferences not only take away the operational space, but also demoralizes the interfered functional area.
•  Consider providing short term recruitments / appointments of sports safety and security specialists / consultants to help in the design and delivery of bespoke safety and security services during each National events. Such specialists have the knowledge and skills in conducting risk assessments, developing bespoke safety and security plans, tests, and delivering such plans. An oversight to this strategy will keep the current unwanted / damaging situation recurring.
• Consider appointing sports safety and security specialists / experts on the FUFA safety and security committee.

These will help to guide IMOC and FUFA executive on best safety and security practices.

In a nut shell; Uganda is blessed to have the biggest number of sports safety and security experts on the African continent.

If FUFA considers creating a professional engagement with them, most of the observed safety and security lapses will be addressed.

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